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Since Libet’s seminal observation that a brain potential related to movement preparation
occurs before participants report to be aware of their movement intention, it has been
debated whether consciousness has causal influence on movement decisions. Here
we review recent advances that provide new insights into the dynamics of human
decision-making and question the validity of different markers used for determining
the onset of neural and conscious events. Motor decisions involve multiple stages
of goal evaluation, intention formation, and action execution. While the validity of the
Bereitschaftspotential (BP) as index of neural movement preparation is controversial,
improved neural markers are able to predict decision outcome even at early stages.
Participants report being conscious of their decisions only at the time of final intention
formation, just before the primary motor cortex starts executing the chosen action.
However, accumulating evidence suggests that this is an artifact of Libet’s clock
method used for assessing consciousness. More refined methods suggest that intention
consciousness does not appear instantaneously but builds up progressively. In this view,
early neural markers of decision outcome are not unconscious but simply reflect conscious
goal evaluation stages which are not final yet and therefore not reported with the clock
method. Alternatives to the Libet clock are discussed that might allow for assessment of
consciousness during decision making with improved sensitivity to early decision stages
and with less influence from meta-conscious and perceptual inferences.
Keywords: volition, Libet, free will, introspection, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
We have the strong and intuitive conviction that we can make
decisions and actions according to our own reflections, prefer-
ences, beliefs, and feelings. In other words, we take it for granted
that the content of our consciousness somehow influences our
decisions and actions. However, this assumption has been seri-
ously challenged by a seminal study of Benjamin Libet published
in the eighties (Libet et al., 1983). Healthy human participants
had to make repeated, self-paced finger movements while their
brain activity was recorded with EEG. In addition, they were
asked to watch a rapidly rotating clock and to report, after each
movement, the clock hand position at the moment they had con-
sciously “felt the urge to move.” It was found that a so-called
Bereitschaftspotential (BP), a brain potential related to voluntary
movements, starts several hundredmilliseconds before the partic-
ipants reported to be conscious about their decision tomove. This
result, which has been reproduced and extended by independent
groups (Haggard and Eimer, 1999; Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al.,
2011; Rigoni et al., 2013a), seems to indicate that consciousness
about a movement decision arises only after the decision has been
made by unconscious neural processes.
The study and its replications have hadmassive impact on cur-
rent concepts of volition and continue to be used as one of the
main arguments against the existence of a freedom to choose. It
seems to demonstrate that our actions are determined by uncon-
scious neural processes whereas consciousness is merely a late
byproduct of neural processing with no influence on its own.
Interestingly, this conclusion may have negative consequences for
our conceptions of freedom and responsibility and hence for
the functioning of society. Indeed, studies have demonstrated
that healthy volunteers reading texts coming to such conclusions
immediately have a greater tendency to cheat (Vohs and Schooler,
2008), are more likely to conform to group norms (Alquist et al.,
2013), and show reduced social behavior (Baumeister et al., 2009),
weakened self-control (Rigoni et al., 2012), impaired cognitive
reactions to errors (Rigoni et al., 2013b), as well as reduced BPs
(Rigoni et al., 2011).
However, a growing body of evidence suggests that the rela-
tionship between neural activity and conscious awareness is more
complicated than previously thought, and other conclusions can
be drawn. In this paper, we review the markers that have been
used to determine the onset of consciousness on the one hand
and the onset of brain processes formovement preparation on the
other hand, and consider whether they are valid and adequate.
MARKERS OF NEURAL DECISION PROCESSES
THE BEREITSCHAFTSPOTENTIAL
Libet used the onset of the so-called BP as marker for the onset of
neural movement preparation. The BP is a slow, surface negative
potential that can be obtained by recording EEG epochs before
repeated self-paced movements and averaging them time-locked
to movement onset (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965; Shibasaki
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et al., 1980). At least 2 different components can be distinguished:
the first component starts about 2 s prior to movement onset and
is bilateral symmetrically distributed with a maximum over the
supplementary motor area (SMA). The second component starts
about 0.4 s before movement onset and has an asymmetrical dis-
tribution with a maximum recorded above the contralateral pri-
mary motor cortex (Shibasaki et al., 1980; Shibasaki and Hallett,
2006).
The usage of the early component of the BP as neuralmarker of
internal movement generation has been justified by the following
findings (Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006).
(1) The BP was initially thought to occur only before self-paced
but not before externally-paced movements (Libet et al.,
1982; Papa et al., 1991), but see below. It is also usually absent
before pathological and involuntarymovements such as peri-
odic leg movements (Trenkwalder et al., 1993), tics (Obeso
et al., 1981), or myoclonus (Shibasaki and Kuroiwa, 1975),
although there are several exceptions (Karp et al., 1996; Oga
et al., 2000).
(2) The onset of the BP seems to be earlier for preplanned than
for spontaneous movements (Libet et al., 1982).
(3) The early component of the BP has greater amplitude when
a selection between 2 or more movements is made, com-
pared to self-paced movements without selection (Praamstra
et al., 1995; Dirnberger et al., 1998), and it is greater before
sequential than before single movements (Kitamura et al.,
1993).
(4) Intracerebral depth recordings showed that the BP occurs
mostly in regions belonging to the sensorimotor system, i.e.,
the SMA, primary motor and sensory cortices, premotor
cortex and the cingulate gyrus, but not in temporal or pari-
etal regions (Shibasaki and Hallett, 2006; Sochurkova et al.,
2006). There is a large body of evidence that these regions
are implicated in movement preparation (Fried et al., 1991;
Thaler et al., 1995; Deiber et al., 1996, 1999; Ball et al., 1999;
Zhang et al., 2012).
However, the following arguments suggest that the BP is in fact
not an adequate marker for actual movement decisions, but that
it represents a diffuse and non-specific preparation of the cortex
for future tasks.
(1) The BP belongs to the family of direct current (DC) poten-
tials, the origin and generators of which are incompletely
understood and a matter of debate. There is evidence for
neuronal mechanisms generating DC potentials, including
excitatory postsynaptic potentials at apical dendrites due
to synaptic input from unspecific thalamic afferences and
axonal collaterals (Caspers et al., 1980; Birbaumer et al.,
1990), and hyperpolarization of the neuronal membrane
following sustained and coordinated spiking of nearby neu-
rons (Buzsaki et al., 2012). In addition, non-neural current
sources such as glial cells, extracellular potassium concen-
trations, and potential differences across epithelia of the
blood-brain barrier seem to contribute as least as much
to DC potential shifts at the surface (Voipio et al., 2003).
Negative shifts in DC potentials can be recorded under many
different circumstances including during the transition from
sleep to wakefulness, sensory stimulation, attention shifts,
hypoxia, and epileptic seizures (Caspers and Schulze, 1959;
Caspers et al., 1980; Birbaumer et al., 1990). Given these
mechanisms and circumstances, DC potentials likely repre-
sent unspecific regional workload, attention and vigilance
rather than specific neural computation.
(2) Unlike initially thought, DC potentials similar to the BP can
also occur before externally cued movements (Thickbroom
et al., 1985; Keller and Heckhausen, 1990; Jahanshahi et al.,
1995; Herrmann et al., 2008). Furthermore, they can be
observed before expected external stimuli without move-
ments (Brunia, 1988) or even before participants decide not
to move (Trevena and Miller, 2010). In these latter cases, the
DC potentials are usually not named BP but contingent neg-
ative variation (CNV) or stimulus preceding negativity (SPN),
due to the different context of occurrence. Nevertheless,
they share commonmechanisms and configurations (Brunia,
1988). In any case, CNV and SPN demonstrate that expect-
ing a future event is sufficient to trigger DC potentials and
hence movements may not be necessary for the generation of
BP either.
(3) A DC potential similar to the BP also precedes the onset of
visual cues instructing the participants to move one of two
buttons. Hence, a BP-like potential started at least 600ms
before participants could knowwhen or which hand tomove,
thus suggesting that is related to task expectation rather than
actual movement preparation (Herrmann et al., 2008).
(4) Not all self-paced movements are preceded by a BP. Hence,
the BP is not necessary for internal movement generation
(Pockett and Purdy, 2010).
(5) The amplitude and configuration of the BP can superim-
pose on other DC potentials related to concomitant tasks
such as spatial attention or visual processing (Lang et al.,
1984), in which case it is impossible to distinguish between
motor and non-motor processes. In this regard, the con-
comitant clock-task used for determination of the onset of
consciousness in Libet’s experiment is of particular con-
cern, as it may contaminate the onset of the BP. Several
studies have found that this is indeed the case: instructing
the participants to pay attention to their decisions leads to
an earlier onset of the BP (Keller and Heckhausen, 1990;
Sirigu et al., 2004; Miller et al., 2011). Hence, the mere
fact that the participants in Libet’s experiment had to deter-
mine the onset of their conscious urge to move seems to
have biased the marker used for assessing neural movement
preparation.
(6) Even random fluctuations in neural activity can produce a
potential similar to the BP if the movement decision is based
on a threshold crossing of these fluctuations (Schurger et al.,
2012).
(7) Lesions to the posterior parietal cortex (Sirigu et al., 2004)
and the cerebellum (Kitamura et al., 1999) lead to an impor-
tant reduction or even disappearance of the BP, thus suggest-
ing that it depends not only on the motor system but on very
distributed neural networks.
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(8) The onset of the early component of the BP does not co-vary
with the reported time of conscious awareness. This pro-
vides evidence against Libet’s conclusion that subconscious
neural processes underlying the BP are the cause of subse-
quent consciousness of motor decisions (Haggard and Eimer,
1999).
Hence, although Libet used the best available marker of neural
motor processing of his time, its validity is controversial today.
Activity in the SMA and primary motor areas contribute to the
BP, but it also seems to be heavily influenced by non-specific and
even non-neural processes. Themeaning of the BP remains there-
fore unclear. It seems to be related to unspecific attention and task
expectation in which case it merely indicates that the study partic-
ipants prepared for some upcoming task in each trial. In addition,
motor-related processed may contribute to its amplitude, but
it may be difficult to discriminate between motor-related and
unspecific components. Hence, the onset of the BP seems to be an
unreliable indicator of the time when the brain starts preparing a
movement.
Yet, the question of how and when conscious considera-
tions influence decisions and actions remains important. Several
groups have therefore tried to find better markers for investigat-
ing neural decision processes, which might enable us to address
Libet’s original question more appropriately.
THE LATERALIZED READINESS POTENTIAL
The lateralized readiness potential (LRP) is a variant of the BP
and a more specific marker for movement preparation (Coles,
1989). It is obtained by subtracting the BP of the central elec-
trode located over the hemisphere of the same side as the moved
limb from the BP of the electrode on the opposite side. It there-
fore measures the extent to which the contralateral motor cortex
mediating a movement is more active than the ipsilateral motor
cortex. It depends mostly on the late component of the BP which
is more directly related to actual movement preparation than the
early component (Shibasaki et al., 1980). Hence, although much
less information about the specificity and the precise meaning of
the LRP is available, it seems to avoid many of the problems of
the BP.
Haggard and Eimer (1999) used the LRP in a slight modifi-
cation of Libet’s original paradigm. Rather than just performing
repetitive, self-paced movements with one hand, the participants
of their study additionally had to choose between left and right
hand movement in each trial. This modification allowed them to
use the onset of the LRP as themoment at which the brain decided
to prepare the movement of the contralateral rather than the ipsi-
lateral hand. This time was then again compared to the time of
conscious decisions that the participants reported using the clock
paradigm developed by Libet. They observed that participants
reported to be conscious about their decisions on average 350ms
before the movements, whereas the LRP started already about
800ms before the movements. Hence, the participants reported
to be conscious about their choice only about 450ms after the
brain had started to prepare the chosen action. This confirms
Libet’s original finding with a more robust marker of neural
motor preparation. Furthermore, the onset times of the LRP only
preceded but, unlike the BP, also systematically co-varied with
the times of conscious intentions reported by the participants.
A recent study assessed DC potentials in the motor cortex with
a Laplacian transform of surface EEG recordings and reported
similar results (Rigoni et al., 2013a).
fMRI MOVEMENT PREDICTORS
When using sophisticated classifiers to learn and decode the
intentions of human participants from fMRI signals, researchers
were able to predict, with a small but significant probability of
55–60%, future decisions already up to 7 s before the partici-
pants reported to become aware of their decisions and up to 8 s
before the actual movements (Figure 1A). The earliest predic-
tions could be made when looking at fMRI activity patterns in
the frontopolar cortex. The primary and supplementary motor
cortices were also predictive, but only after the earliest times of
conscious decisions reported by the participants. The onset of
conscious decisions was measured using a variant of Libet’s orig-
inal clock paradigm optimized for fMRI. As in Libet’s original
study, these findings again suggested that “a network of high-
level control areas begins to prepare an upcoming decision long
before it enters awareness” (Soon et al., 2008). This time, the pre-
dictors of future decisions were validated with state of the art
techniques.
NEURAL FIRING RATE
Fried et al. (2011) recorded activity of neurons in human partic-
ipants while they performed self-paced finger movements. They
observed a progressive recruitment of neurons in the supplemen-
tary motor starting about 1000ms before participants reported
to be conscious about their decisions. Hence, changes in firing
rate of individual neurons showed a similar time course as the
BP recorded at the surface. They were able to predict the time
point of future movements from the firing rate of neurons with
a mean error of 152ms. In addition, the spiking rate of neurons
in the medial frontal and temporal lobes significantly predicted
the chosen movement in a two-option forced choice task with
an accuracy of ∼70%, more than 1 s before participants reported
to have a conscious movement intention (Figure 1B). The pre-
dictive value of firing rate for motor decisions was verified with
crossvalidation techniques.
HIGH-GAMMA OSCILLATIONS
Recent studies using intracranial and surface EEG recordings have
demonstrated that fast neural oscillations in the so-called gamma
and high-gamma frequency range (∼40–200Hz) are reliable and
specific markers of local neural processing that outperform tradi-
tional EEG/MEG and fMRI markers in combined spatiotemporal
resolution.
(1) Like slower EEG/MEG rhythms, gamma, and high-gamma
oscillations result from postsynaptic currents and therefore
reflect synaptic input (Buzsaki et al., 2012). Yet, in con-
trast to other rhythms, they also correlate with the spiking
rate of nearby neurons (Rasch et al., 2008; Whittingstall
and Logothetis, 2009). Hence they also contain information
about the output of local neural computation.
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of neural predictors of movement decisions during
two-option forced choice tasks. (A) The pattern of fMRI activation in the
fronto-polar cortex predicts the chosenmovement up to 8 s before the button
press. The gray vertical line indicates the earliest time point of conscious
intentions reported by the participants. Significant time points are marked with
filled circles. Adapted from Soon et al. (2008) by permission fromMacmillan
Publishers Ltd.:Nature Neuroscience. (B) The neural firing rate of neurons in
medial frontal and temporal cortex (solid line) predicts the chosenmovement
more than 1 s before participants report to be conscious of their intention
(dashed vertical line). The dashed horizontal line represents the classifier
performance upon shuffling left-right responses. From Fried et al. (2011) with
permission from Cell Press. (C) High-gamma activity in the primary motor
cortices of 7 participants (solid curves) discriminates between left and right
movement decisions after participants report their intentions. Black squares
mark the onset of an activity difference in the primary motor cortices indicating
that the brain starts preparing the chosenmovement. The gray stair plot shows
the cumulative distribution of subjective intentions reportedby the participants.
The earliest high-gamma activation differences in M1 between left vs. right
hand choices were observed at 194ms (±74ms) beforemovement onset,
which was not significantly different from the subjective intention onset
reported at 255± 109ms [t(6) = 1.1, p = 0.32].Modified from Guggisberg
et al. (2011) with permission from Elsevier.
(2) Unlike other EEG/MEG rhythms, they correlate positively
with the fMRI hemodynamic response (Logothetis et al.,
2001; Brovelli et al., 2005; Niessing et al., 2005). Hence they
reflect local neural activity while having much better time
resolution than fMRI.
(3) They are spatially more focal and more task specific than
slow neural oscillations and event-related potentials (Brovelli
et al., 2005; Edwards et al., 2005; Crone et al., 2006; Canolty
et al., 2007).
(4) In intracranial recordings, they have a sufficiently high
signal-to-noise ratio to allow tracking even the time course
of neural processing in single trials (Edwards et al., 2010).
High-gamma oscillations are therefore excellent indices of neu-
ral activity for assessing the dynamics of cortical processing.
Advances in source localization algorithms allow reconstructing
high-gamma rhythms also from surface recordings, given suffi-
cient repetitions of a task (Dalal et al., 2008). Thus, it is possible
to watch the brain decide, i.e., to look into the dynamic neural
processes underlying human decision-making. Guggisberg et al.
(2011) compared high-gamma markers of neural processing to
subjective times of decision onset obtained with the clockmethod
introduced by Libet. It was found that participants report to be
conscious about their choice at the time point at which high-
gamma activity in the motor cortex contralateral to the moved
finger starts to increase more than high-gamma activity in the
ipsilateral hemisphere indicating that the brain starts preparing
the chosen action. Hence, when using high-gamma activity of
the motor cortex as specific marker of cortical movement prepa-
ration, there was no evidence for a delayed onset of conscious
awareness in forced choice tasks (Figure 1C).
NEURAL DYNAMICS OF MOVEMENT DECISIONS
Figure 2 and Supplementary Tables S1, S2 recapitulate the onset
times of neural and subjective events reported in the literature on
FIGURE 2 | Summary of subjective (top) and neural (bottom) markers
of motor decisions reported in the literature. W, subjective intention
onset as determined with the Libet clock; M, subjective onset of finger
movement as determined with the Libet clock; T, subjective intention onset
as determined with random sampling; P, point of no return after which
participants cannot stop an intended movement anymore; BP,
Bereitschaftspotential; LRP, lateralized readiness potential; fMRI, predictors
of movement decisions decoded from fMRI recordings; Firing rate,
predictors of movement times decoded from neural firing rate in the SMA;
High-gamma, significant differences in high-gamma power in the left vs.
right primary motor cortex during left vs. right finger movements; EMG,
electromyogram.
movement decisions. The different markers yield highly variable
results. How can we explain the divergences between the differ-
ent studies? The following sections will discuss several factors and
propose an interpretation.
The highly variable onset times of neural events predicting
decisions strongly suggest that the different markers capture dif-
ferent stages in the dynamic process of decision-making. But
which are these stages and at which time point in the sequence
of neural activations do participants report to be conscious about
their intentions?
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Several excellent reviews have proposed models on the neural
dynamics of motor decisions (Brass and Haggard, 2008; Haggard,
2008; De Jong, 2011; Krieghoff et al., 2011; Brass et al., 2013).
Haggard (2008) suggested that human volition involves 4 distinct
processing stages.
(1) Early whether decision: new motivations and reasons for
action appear and take over the control of the action system
from routine stimulus-based responding.
(2) What decisions: the person first selects a goal among several
options and then the movements necessary to achieve this
goal.
(3) Late whether decisions: a forward model is built based on
information about the chosen voluntary action and com-
pared to the initial goal description. This final check may
result in adjustments or even in a complete abortion (veto)
of the planned movement. It is only at this stage that the
definitive choice for an action is made.
(4) The chosen action is executed.
This sequence adapts to different choice contexts (Brass and
Haggard, 2008; Krieghoff et al., 2011). In the case of sim-
ple self-paced when decisions as studied in the original Libet
paradigm, the what decision may be absent whereas the action
time receives more attention. This seems to be associated with
a particular recruitment of the pre-supplementary motor area
(pre-SMA) (Gerloff et al., 1998; Deiber et al., 1999; Jenkins et al.,
2000). Guggisberg et al. (2008) localized high-gamma activa-
tions frommagnetoencephalography (MEG) recordings obtained
during two-option forced choice decisions with and without per-
ceptual information. The observed brain activations during this
choice context were divided into 4 overlapping processing stages
corresponding to 4 cognitive steps of choice.
(1) Perception of the options mediated by primary and sec-
ondary sensory cortices; e.g., the individual sees two kinds
of ice cream.
(2) Retrieval of information regarding the value of the options. If
the 2 options are perceptually different, the sensory informa-
tion is analyzed by specialized brain areas; e.g., appearance
and price of the options are compared, memories of ear-
lier experiences with the options are recalled, and personal
preferences analyzed.
(3) Attribution of an overall value to each option and formation
of an intention corresponding to the option with the highest
current value. This stage seems to involve the parietal cor-
tex and the SMA. If the options are perceptually equal, the
inferior parietal lobule is activated.
(4) Execution of the action corresponding to the choice, medi-
ated by the motor cortex.
Similar dynamics have also been described in other studies with
other neural oscillation frequencies (e.g., Siegel et al., 2011). Free
decisions without perceptual discrimination of the value of the
options are based on increased recruitment of the bilateral infe-
rior parietal lobules and the cerebellum compared to decisions
with perceptual information (Deiber et al., 1996; Guggisberg
et al., 2008) although they also share common resources (Bode
et al., 2013). More importantly, free decisions can be predicted
earlier than value-constrained decisions (Bode et al., 2012), and
possibly even from random noise in neuronal spiking (Rolls and
Deco, 2011).
Evaluation stages lead to an accumulation of activity in mesial
motor areas (in particular the SMA) until it crosses a threshold
which finally leads to a release of the selected action (Fried et al.,
2011; Zhang et al., 2012).
In sum, the different neural predictors of future decisions
reported in the literature likely capture different stages of neu-
ral decision processing and are derived from different decision
types. For instance, fMRI patterns in the fronto-polar cortex
might correspond to early whether stages of free what decisions.
In contrast, high-gamma activity in the primary motor cortex is
probably related to late stages of action preparation and execu-
tion. This may explain the large differences in the onset times of
these markers (Figure 2).
To come back to Libet’s question, when in the sequence of neu-
ral choice processing do humans report to become conscious of
their intentions? To address this, Guggisberg et al. (2011) recon-
structed high-gamma activations during a forced choice task at
the reported subjective time point of conscious intention. They
found significant activations in brain regions responsible for the
formation of intentions, i.e., in the SMA and the posterior parietal
cortex (Figure 3A). This was the case both for free as well as for
value-constrained decisions. Hence, participants report the onset
of their decisions roughly at the time of high-gamma activity rises
in brain areas responsible for intention, just before high-gamma
activity in the primary motor cortex indicates the preparation
of a chosen movement. This suggests that conscious volition is
reported at the late whether decision stage, when the final inten-
tion is formed and just before the forward model is accepted and
released for execution. It is probable that participants report their
conscious motor urges at a similar stage of final intention for-
mation also in case of self-paced movements as studied in Libet’s
original paradigm.
Now, several studies were able to predict future decisions
already from neural processes occurring long before this late
whether stage of decision-making. Participants did not report to
be conscious of their decisions during these earlier stages, even
though the choices could be predicted from markers of neural
activity. Does this mean that decisions are unconsciously gen-
erated? Before we can conclude this, we need to verify whether
the measures used for determining the onset time of conscious
decisions are valid.
MARKERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND
META-CONSCIOUSNESS
The clock task developed by Libet and its later variants are used
to obtain subjective reports of the study participants about the
onset time of decisions in consciousness. An implicit assumption
underlying the conclusions of Libet et al. (1983) and Soon et al.
(2008) is that these reported times are unbiased indices of the true
onset times of conscious decisions. Is this assumption justified?
The following findings support the validity of the Libet clock
for determining subjective event times.
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FIGURE 3 | Spatially distinct neural substrates of primary intention (A) and introspection of intentions (B). Abbreviations: SMA, supplementary motor
area; SPL, superior parietal lobule; L, left; R, right. Reproduced from Guggisberg et al. (2011) with permission from Elsevier.
(1) Libet verified in his original study that participants were able
to report relatively accurately the onset of tones and finger
movements (Libet et al., 1983).
(2) Reported times of finger movements were found to be rela-
tively robust to manipulations of the physical characteristics
of the rotating spot and to different instructions given to the
participants (Pockett and Miller, 2007).
However, these validations are based on the timing of external
events. When it comes to the timing of internal intentions, there
is accumulating evidence that Libet’s clock method is problem-
atic. Hence, there are several other possible interpretations of
the delayed reports of conscious decisions which disagree with
the conclusion that decision stages before the reported times are
unconscious.
(1) Subjective onset times of intention onset are influenced by
perceptual information obtained during and after the deci-
sion. Thus, it is possible to manipulate the reported decision
times by presenting a deceptive auditory signal just after
the hand movements chosen by the participants (Banks and
Isham, 2009; Rigoni et al., 2010), or by transiently disturbing
the neural processing just after the movements with a mag-
netic pulse applied to the SMA (Lau et al., 2007). Similarly,
the rotation speed of the clock has significant confounding
impact on the intention times reported by the participants
(Danquah et al., 2008).
(2) Another issue concerns the instructions given to the study
participants to report the time when they “make their con-
scious motor decision” or when they “feel the urge to move.”
It is likely that the participants interpreted this as having to
indicate the time when a final decision was reached and a
corresponding intention made and not as the time when they
started considering the options. Indeed, as discussed above,
the times reported by the participants match the time of
increased high-gamma oscillations in brain regions respon-
sible for final intention formation (Guggisberg et al., 2011).
This does, however, not necessarily mean that the preced-
ing decision stages from which earlier movement predictors
were extracted were unconscious. During decision-making,
choices are based on values attributed to the available
options (Sugrue et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2006). Hence, the
option evaluation stages must determine, at least for ratio-
nal choices, the decision made in subsequent intention stages
such that the option with greatest final subjective value is
chosen. It is therefore not surprising that one can decode,
with a certain probability, future decisions from early neural
processes underlying goal evaluation and value representa-
tion. Study participants may not have reported their decision
at this time simply because it was not final yet, and not
because it was unconsciously initiated. If the participants had
been instructed to report the earliest time when they con-
sciously start considering the options, they would probably
have reported much earlier onset times that might even have
matched the times obtained with the fMRI classifiers.
(3) The subjective timing tasks yield a binarymeasure of the con-
tent of consciousness over time: before the reported onset
time, consciousness of decisions is absent; at the reported
time it becomes present (Fahle et al., 2011). In contrast,
the markers used for assessing the onset of neural processes
mediating decisions are continuous measures of voltage (in
the case of the BP, LRP, or high-gamma oscillations), spik-
ing rate, or probability (in the case of the fMRI classifiers).
However, as shown above, the decision for a movement does
not abruptly appear in a binary manner, but is gradually
constructed. Hence, the Libet paradigm imposes a trans-
lation of the continuous tendency to opt for a movement
to a binary measure. Depending on when the participants
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set the cutoff for this binary translation, this will inevitably
lead to a smaller or greater delay in reported onset of con-
sciousness (see Figure 4). Indeed, Fahle et al. (2011) have
shown that when participants can use a continuous measure
to indicate their tendency for a movement decision such as
joystickmovements, they report to become conscious of their
decisions much earlier than suggested by a binary measure.
(4) Let us consider what actually happens in the participants’
mind and brain when they introspect the onset time of
their conscious decisions. A straightforward answer proposed
already by the philosopher Brentano (1874) would be that
introspection arises directly and automatically from ongoing
conscious processing. Participants perform the tasks of the
Libet paradigm with different thoughts entering conscious-
ness and as soon as the content of consciousness is their
decision, they can automatically memorize and report it.
However, several lines of evidence suggest that it is not as sim-
ple as this. The phenomenologist tradition which is particu-
larly devoted to the examination of the mind with introspec-
tion has long pointed out that ongoing consciousness is not
the same thing as introspection (Husserl, 1984; Gallagher and
Zahavi, 2010). Ongoing first-order consciousness is defined
as the direct, continuous, unreflected experience, whereas
introspection (also named meta-consciousness) is defined as
an additional intermittent, explicit re-representation of the
contents of first-order consciousness (Schooler, 2002; Marcel,
2003; Overgaard and Sorensen, 2004). Experiencing self-
paced movement decisions would be an example of con-
tent in first-order consciousness, whereas determining that
I have just now made a decision, as it is required in Libet’s
clock paradigm, is an instance of introspection. More recent
research has experimentally corroborated that there are dis-
sociations between ongoing first-order consciousness and
intermittent introspection and that introspection can lead
to transformations and misrepresentations of the original
conscious experience (Schooler, 2002; Marcel, 2003).
First-order consciousness and introspection also disso-
ciate with regards to the neural structures they rely on.
First-order consciousness of the intention to move is associ-
ated with an activation of the (pre-)SMA and the posterior
parietal cortex (Figure 3A) (Lau et al., 2004; Guggisberg
et al., 2011) whereas introspection of intention times with
the Libet clock activates additional brain areas: the bilateral
FIGURE 4 | The Libet clock requires a translation of the continuous
experience of consciousness to a binary onset time. This may introduce
delays in the reported intention onset.
angular gyri (Figure 3B) (Guggisberg et al., 2011). Electrical
stimulation of the SMA provokes an urge to move a specific
body part in a specific direction and even a physical move-
ment with stronger stimulation intensities (Fried et al., 1991).
Conversely, electrical stimulation of the angular gyri induces
the impression of having the desire to move, which is rather
unspecific with regard to whichmovement is to be performed
and not accompanied by the actual movement, even with
strong stimulation intensities (Desmurget et al., 2009). The
difference between the endogenous aspect of angular stim-
ulations and the obligatory motor preparation character of
SMA stimulations fits well with their different implications
in introspection vs. first-order consciousness. Furthermore,
patients with lesions in the angular gyri are incapable of
introspecting the time of their decisions, but they keep their
ability to make first-order conscious decisions (Sirigu et al.,
2004), thus suggesting that the angular gyri mediate the
introspection of decisions, but not the decisions themselves.
The SMAmay in fact have a double role and additionally con-
tribute to introspective reports of event times. After an early
activation peak during intention formation, it is reactivated
after action execution (Cunnington et al., 2006; Guggisberg
et al., 2008) and this post-action reactivation seems to have a
causal role in introspection of event times (Lau et al., 2007).
Although different interpretations are possible for each of
these findings, they suggest together with behavioral evidence
that healthy humans recruit specific introspection networks
to access and report relevant neural processes in separate
decision-making networks. This means that subjective event
times obtained with the Libet clock do not directly reflect the
original, first-order conscious experience of the participants
(which is mediated by decision-making networks, Figure 3A)
but depend on interactions with additional introspection
processes (Figure 3B).
Introspection processes can thereby distort the original
conscious experience. Since the neural mechanisms of intro-
spection have resource constraints, they are susceptible to
interference with other ongoing neural activity. Thus, intro-
spection may be disturbed by concurring tasks that require
neural resources in close temporal proximity to the act of
introspection, as it has indeed been observed in numer-
ous studies (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997; Eagleman and
Sejnowski, 2000; Haggard et al., 2002; Stetson et al., 2006;
Corallo et al., 2008; Banks and Isham, 2009). The resulting
error can be in the order of ∼50ms (Banks and Pockett,
2007). In addition, introspection can misrepresent the origi-
nal experience for instance when one verbally reports non-
verbal or ambiguous experiences (Schooler, 2002; Marcel,
2003).
Taken together, evidence from several lines of research
suggests the existence of two hierarchical levels of con-
sciousness: a first-order consciousness and an intermit-
tent introspective consciousness which is also named
meta-consciousness (Schooler, 2002). Subjective reports
obtained in the Libet paradigm arise in meta-consciousness
(Guggisberg et al., 2011). Hence, even though early decision
stages seem to be “meta-unconscious”, i.e., ignored by or
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inaccessible to introspection/meta-consciousness, they may
still be first-order conscious.
Evidence that this is indeed the case comes from a study
which used an alternative method to the Libet clock for
determining the onset of conscious movement decisions.
Participants were presented tones in random intervals before
self-paced movements. Each tone prompted them to decide
immediately (rather than using post-hoc recall as in the Libet
paradigm), whether or not there was an intention to move.
The onset of conscious decisions measured with this alter-
native method turned out to be much earlier than when
measured with the Libet clock, i.e., on average 1.4 s before
the movements (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008).
In sum, several lines of research consistently demonstrate lim-
itations of the clock method used in Libet’s paradigm, although
the severity of these limitations is still somewhat controversial. In
the best case, the onset times of conscious intentions obtained
with Libet’s clock method are merely imprecise. Alternatively,
they may represent meta-conscious inferences rather than the
primary conscious experience of intention. In the worst case,
humans do not have introspective access to their intentions and
merely report post-hoc confabulations based on sensory percep-
tions during and after the action. In any case, the clock method
fails to capture early contents of consciousness during goal eval-
uation. Many of these concerns also apply to an fMRI variant of
Libet’s clock method (Soon et al., 2008). It is therefore unclear
whether participants are aware of early neural processes which are
predictive for subsequent decisions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The work of Libet has inspired generations of researchers and
has started a still ongoing experimental quest on the interaction
between neural processing and consciousness. He has been the
first to show that decisions are not instantaneous or purely mental
events, but that they represent the readout of an implemen-
tational brain process. However, findings obtained with Libet’s
clock paradigm still seem to suggest that consciousness of inten-
tions is a single, instantaneous event.Most current interpretations
of the research inspired by Libet assume that unconscious neu-
ral decision processes build up until they cross a threshold which
then enables the instantaneous appearance of a full-blown con-
scious intention (Soon et al., 2008; Fried et al., 2011). However,
this instantaneous appearance of conscious intentions might be
an artifact of the method used for assessing the contents of
consciousness. Studies using alternatives to the Libet clock have
suggested that intention consciousness is a multistage process just
as the neural mechanisms of motor decisions (Matsuhashi and
Hallett, 2008; Fahle et al., 2011). The time of conscious intentions
reported by the participants therefore might be only the culmi-
nation of preceding conscious deliberations, not a unique and
instantaneous event. If this is true, the delay between the onset
of neural predictors of motor decisions and conscious intentions
reported with the Libet clock is not due to unconscious neural
processes but due to conscious evaluations which are not final
yet. The data currently available does not allow drawing definitive
conclusions and other interpretations are equally possible. There
Table 1 | Overview of alternatives to the Libet clock for investigating
consciousness during decision-making.
Approach References
Thinking aloud: Participants provide
concurrent verbal reports about their ongoing
conscious considerations
Fox et al. (2011)
Joystick movements: Participants indicate
their current propensity to move with gradual
joystick movements
Fahle et al. (2011)
Random and unexpected sampling: A signal





are in fact instances when motor decisions are clearly initiated
unconsciously (Custers and Aarts, 2010). The question whether
early neural predictors of decision outcome are conscious is cur-
rently unresolved and requires more refinedmethods for assessing
consciousness. Yet, the model proposed here is consistent with
current findings without putting into question our conviction
that we can consciously influence motor decisions. Given recent
observations that denying the existence of free will has negative
behavioral consequences (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumeister
et al., 2009; Rigoni et al., 2012, 2013b; Alquist et al., 2013), this
new conclusion could have significant behavioral relevance.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Like the assessment of neural activity, the measurement of
consciousness turns out to have its pitfalls and to require spe-
cial care. However, there is no reason to go back to behaviorist
reasoning that any scientific study using introspection and sub-
jective reports is futile. On the contrary, future efforts should take
into account current knowledge about the hierarchic structure of
consciousness and the validity of different methods formeasuring
consciousness. Now that we have available valid markers of neu-
ral processing, we should try to develop and use refined markers
also for the assessment of the contents of consciousness. In par-
ticular, it seems to be important to minimize the distorting effect
of meta-consciousness and post-hoc perceptions. Table 1 lists sev-
eral promising alternatives to Libet’s clock task. Although it may
be difficult to avoid all meta-conscious inferences, the follow-
ing strategies have been proposed to favor the apprehension of
first-order consciousness.
- Use simple instructions and tasks with which the participants
have sufficient skills (Marcel, 2003).
- Obtain immediate reports about current intentions rather than
post-hoc recalls (Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008).
- Use intermittent and unexpected probing to favor sponta-
neous and non-reflexive reports (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2004;
Matsuhashi and Hallett, 2008).
- Bring the participants in an immersive state of mind allowing
them to make more direct and non-reflexive recollections of
their first-order consciousness (Marcel, 2003).
- Use continuous rather than binary measures (Fahle et al.,
2011).
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- Let participants speak aloud their ongoing thoughts about their
intentions (Fox et al., 2011).
- Obtain more than one subjective measure of consciousness
to be able to estimate the robustness and consistency of the
assessment (Marcel, 2003).
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